[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 1. _a._ 1, 6, 7. XV. _MADAM,_ Your _Author_ is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace the opinion of those which hold, that Perception is made by figuring, to bring in this following example:[1] _Suppose_, says he, _one Particle should shape it self into a_ George on Horse-back _with a Lance in his hand, and another into an Inchanted Castle; this_ George on Horse-back _must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress and similitude: But what then? Truly the Encounter will be very Unfortunate, for S._ George _indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in the form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on Horse-back; which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks._ I answer, first, That there is no Particle single and alone by it self; Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational matter to put it self into such figures, and to make such encounters, then for an Immaterial mind or substance to imagine it; for no imagination can be without figure, and how should an Immaterial created substance present such Figures, but by making them either in it self or upon matter? For S. _George_ and the _Castle_ are figures, and their encounters are real fighting actions, and how such figures and actions can be in the mind or memory, and yet not be, is impossible to conceive; for, as I said, those figures and actions must be either in the incorporeal mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if the figures and motions may be in an incorporeal substance, much more is it probable for them to be in a corporeal; nay if the figures and their actions can be in gross corporeal matter, why should they not be in the purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And as for being made known to the whole body, and every part thereof, it is not necessary, no more then it is necessary, that the private actions of every Man or Family should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or Town, or Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may be as demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in my mind, is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal or material; For how can that be naturally demonstrable, which naturally is nothing? But your _Author_ believes the Mind or rational Soul to be individable, and therefore concludes, that the Parts of the same Matter, although at great distance, must of necessity know each Particular act of each several Part; but that is not necessary; for if there were not ignorance through the division of Parts, every man and other creatures would know alike; and there is no better proof, that matter, or any particular creature in nature is not governed by a created Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts; for the