Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
hand doth not know what pain the head feels, which certainly it would
do, if the mind were not dividable into parts, but an individable
substance. But this is well to be observed, that some parts in some
actions agree generally in one body, and some not; as for example,
temperance and appetite do not agree; for the corporeal actions of
appetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of such or such
other parts, but the corporeal actions of temperance do hinder and
forbid it; whereupon there is a faction amongst the several parts: for
example, a Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is made by
such corporeal actions as make appetite; the rational corporeal motions
or actions which make temperance, oppose those that make appetite,
and that sort of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand
and other parts of the body obeying the strongest side; and if there
be no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet many times the appetite
continues; that is, the parts continue in the same motions that make
such an appetite; but if the appetite doth not continue, then those
parts have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the appetite is
satisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made the appetite, have
altered their former motions. But oftentimes the rational corporeal
motions may so agree with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition
or crossing at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement betwixt
them, at least an approvement; so that the rational may approve what
the sensitive covet or desire: Also some motions of the rational, as
also of the sensitive matter, may disagree amongst themselves, as we
see, that a man will often have a divided mind; for he will love and
hate the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same thing, as
to be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World: Moreover, this is to be
observed, That all rational perceptions or cogitations, are not so
perspicuous and clear as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but
there is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are not
so well perceivable without comparing several figures together, which
proves, they are not made by an individable, immaterial Spirit, but
by dividable corporeal parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes
false, and seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and
correct his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them, according as
the figures continue or are dissolved and altered by change of motion,
and according as the actions are quick or slow in these alterations,
the humane mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or
dissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, Imaginations,
Understanding, and the like, are more or less; And according as these
figures last, so is constancy or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness,
and as those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but sometimes
they are so constant and permanent, as they last as long as the figure
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