Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
Again, your _Author_ sayes, _That Man doth excel all other Animals in
this faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt
to enquire the Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with
it: Besides this_ (sayes he) _Man hath an other degree of Excellence,
that he can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General Rules
called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can reason or reckon not
onely in Number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added
unto, or substracted from an other._ To which I answer, That according
to my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as much;
but by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man
denies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows,
whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and
flowing, and the saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know
more of the nature and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or
whether Worms do not know more of the nature of Earth, and how Plants
are produced? or Bees of the several sorts of juices of Flowers, then
Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by
their manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of
Man, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at
all. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause
of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in
Nature, when as _Nature_ is not capable to make one God, much less so
many as Mankind; and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would
not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature, _But_ (says your
_Author_) _this Priviledge in Man is allay'd by another, which is, No
living Creature is subject to absurdity, but onely Man._ Certainly,
_Madam_, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do
as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were not to
avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore
I think, not onely Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and
subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly
know the Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures,
no not of his own Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by
himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he conceives to be
true or wise, an other may conceive to be false and foolish. But Man
may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other
Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be
as Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in
those things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what
your _Author_ says, _That Children are not endued with Reason at all,
till they have attained to the use of Speech_; for Reason is in those
Creatures which have not Speech, witness Horses, especially those which
are taught in the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the weak
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