Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
understanding in Children, I have discoursed thereof in my Book of
Philosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tire you too much at
once, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend,_
_and Servant._
[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.
XI.
_Madam,_
I sent you word in my last, that your _Author's_ opinion is, _That
Children are not endued with Reason at all, until they have attained
to the use of Speech,_ in the same Chapter[1] he speaks to the same
purpose thus: _Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor
gotten by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by industry._
To which I reply onely this, That it might as well be said, a
Child when new born hath not flesh and blood, because by taking in
nourishment or food, the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or,
that a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go, or with
two arms and hands, because he cannot help himself; or that he is not
born with a tongue, because he cannot speak: For although Reason doth
not move in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in Youth as in
Age, yet that doth not prove that Children are without Reason, because
they cannot run and prate: I grant, some other Creatures appear to
have more Knowledg when new born then others; as for example, a young
Foal has more knowledg than a young Child, because a Child cannot run
and play; besides a Foal knows his own Dam, and can tell where to
take his food, as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot
do so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but yet this doth not
prove, that a Child hath no reason at all; Neither can I perceive
that man is a Monopoler of all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but
that Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and
Animals; for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals, although they
cannot slice, pound or infuse, as man can, yet they can work upon man
more subtilly, wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting,
spitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding and infusing
them, and Vegetables will as wisely nourish Men, as Men can nourish
Vegetables; Also some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to
Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock, Nightshade, and many
more; and a little Poppy will as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep,
though silently, then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But
because they do not act in such manner or way as Man, Man judgeth them
to be without sense and reason; and because they do not prate and
talk as Man, Man believes they have not so much wit as he hath; and
because they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not industrious;
the like for Infants concerning Reason. But certainly, it is not local
motion or speech that makes sense and reason, but sense and reason
makes them; neither is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of
Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and proprieties of
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