draws them this way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions, being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes on in the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and the like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or probability of Natural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my opinion Passions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by the motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination, Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more to the actions of the Body then the Mind: 'Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish them. But having treated hereof at large in my other Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and desire you to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much variety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as it cannot be easily express'd. To conclude, I do not perceive that your _Author_ tells or expresses what the cause is of such or such actions, onely he mentions their dependance, which is, as if a man should converse with a Nobleman's Friend or Servant, and not know the Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I am, Madam, _Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant._ [1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 6. XIII. _Madam,_