Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
An _Accident_, says your _Author_,[1] _is nothing else, but the manner
of our Conception of body, or that Faculty of any body, by which it
works in us a Conception of it self_; To which I willingly consent;
but yet I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the body,
for as impossible it is that the essence of Nature should be separable
from Nature, as impossible is it that the various modes or alterations,
either of Figures or Motions, should be separable from matter or body;
Wherefore when he goes on, and says,[2] _An accident is not a body,
but in a body, yet not so, as if any thing were contained therein, as
if for example, redness were in blood in the same manner as blood is
in a bloody cloth; but as magnitude is in that which is great, rest in
that which resteth, motion in that which is moved_; I answer, that in
my opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a body, and that
redness is as well in blood, as blood is in a bloody cloth, or any
other colour in any thing else; for there is no colour without a body,
but every colour hath as well a body as any thing else, and if Colour
be a separable accident, I would fain know, how it can be separated
from a subject, being bodiless, for that which is no body is nothing,
and nothing cannot be taken away from any thing; Wherefore as for
natural Colour it cannot be taken away from any creature, without the
parts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours, when
they are taken away, it is a separation of two bodies, which joyned
together; and if Colour, or Hardness, or Softness do change, it is
nothing else but an alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for
all changes and alterations remain in the power of Corporeal motions,
as I have said in other places; for we might as well say, life doth
not remain in nature, when a body turns from an animal to some other
figure, as believe that those, they name accidents, do not remain in
Corporeal Motions; Wherefore I am not of your _Authors_ mind, when
he says,[3] that _when a White thing is made black, the whiteness
perishes_; for it cannot perish, although it is altered from white to
black, being in the power of the same matter, to turn it again from
black to white, so as it may make infinite Repetitions of the same
thing; but by reason nature takes delight in variety, she seldom uses
such repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away the Power of
self-moving matter, for it doth not, and it cannot, are two several
things, and the latter doth not necessarily follow upon the former;
Wherefore not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for if this
were possible, the whole body of nature might perish also, for if so
many Figures and Creatures should be annihilated and perish without
any supply or new Creation, Nature would grow less, and at last become
nothing; besides it is as difficult for Nature to turn something into
nothing, as to Create something out of nothing; Wherefore as there is
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