2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind. This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour, sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations, no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did not adequately distinguish between sensations and intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_ transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God, . . . . . . . 16 5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The impossibility of Materialism has generally been recognized (_e.g._ by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel). If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the higher than _vice versa_, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 LECTURE II THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to recognize the necessity of a Mind which _thinks_ the world. Insufficiency of this view. {xiii} 2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with nothing but succession, never with Causality. The Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition. Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events which _we_ do not cause must be caused by some other Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that this cause must be _One_ Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought, Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the relations between mind and matter, and with the tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48 6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 LECTURE III GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58