Man is a moral force, only inasmuch as he is a free force. Any philosophy that attempts the liberty of man, attempts, without knowing it, morals itself. Man then is free, and as he is a moral agent only in proportion as he is free, it would seem that his liberty is the only attribute of his soul from which Providence has designed to remove all the boundaries. “What is here very remarkable,” says Descartes, “is that, of all within me, there is not one thing so perfect or so great, but that I know it might be greater and more perfect. Thus, for example, if I consider my faculty of conceiving, I find it of very small extent, and very limited. If, in the same manner, I examine the memory, the imagination, or any other one of my faculties, I find not one that is not very limited and very small. Within me there is only my will or my liberty of free will, which I feel to be so great that I conceive not the idea of another more full and of greater extent.”[45] II. OF GALL. OF THE FACULTIES. Gall’s philosophy consists wholly in the substitution of _multiplicity_ for _unity_. In place of one general and single brain,[46] he substitutes a number of small brains: instead of one general sole understanding, he substitutes several individual understandings.[47] These pretended _individual understandings_ are the _faculties_. Now, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven of these faculties, each one of them (since each one is a peculiar understanding) endowed with its perceptive faculty, its memory, its judgment, its imagination; &c.[48] Hence, there are twenty-seven perceptive faculties, twenty-seven memories, twenty-seven judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c. For, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute is not less distinct than each faculty. The memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of one faculty are not the memory, judgment, or imagination of another faculty. “The sense of numbers,” says he, “possesses a judgment for the relations of numbers; the sense of the arts, a judgment for works of art; but where the fundamental faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to objects of that faculty must necessarily be wanting likewise.”[49] He says further: “It is impossible for an individual to possess imagination and judgment for any object with the fundamental faculty for which he has not been gifted by nature.”[50] Thus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven faculties; and as there are twenty-seven faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories, judgments, imaginations, &c. In one word, there is no such thing as a general understanding; but there are twenty-seven special understandings, with three or four times twenty-seven distinct attributes of each. Such is the entire psycology of Gall.