To proceed. Gall’s twenty-seven faculties are: the instinct of propagation, love of offspring, self-defence, the carnivorous instinct, the sense of property, friendship, cunning, pride, vanity, circumspection, memory for things, memory for words, sense of locality, sense of persons, sense of language, of relations of colours, relations of sounds, relations of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative sagacity, the metaphysical genius, sarcasm, poetic talent, benevolence, imitation, religion, firmness. Gall says that these faculties are innate,[51] and this assertion certainly will not be contested. Locke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine of innate ideas, never decried the _innateness_ of our faculties. He always regarded them as natural, that is to say, _innate_.[52] Condillac himself, who charges Locke with having considered the faculties of the soul as _innate_, in making these charges confounds the _faculties of the soul_ with the _operations of the soul_.[53] Now, that which is perfectly true as to the _operations of the soul_, is by no means so as regards her _faculties_. All the faculties of the soul are innate and contemporary, for they are nothing more than _modes_ of the soul; indeed, they are the soul itself, viewed under different aspects. But the operations of the soul succeed each other, and beget each other. There can be no memory without previous perception; there can be no judgment without recollection. In order that there may be a will, there must have been a judgment, &c. After saying that the faculties are innate, Gall says also that they are _independent_.[54] And if, by the word _independent_, he means distinct, there is nothing less contestible. But if, by this word _independent_, he understood (as indeed he does understand) that each faculty is a real understanding, the question is altered and the difficulty begins. For, if each individual faculty is a proper understanding, it follows that there are as many understandings as there are faculties, and the understanding ceases to be _one_, and the _me_ is no longer _one_. I am well aware that this is exactly what Gall means; he says it, and reiterates it throughout his work. He says it, but does not prove it. And how should he prove it? Can we prove any thing against our consciousness? “I remark here, in the first place,” says Descartes, “that there is a great difference between the mind and the body, in that the body is, by its nature, always divisible, and the mind wholly indivisible. For, in fact, when I contemplate it—that is, when I contemplate my own self—and consider myself as a thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself any parts, but I clearly know and conceive that I am a thing absolutely one and complete.”[55]