[53] “Locke contents himself,” says he, “with acknowledging that the soul perceives, doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, and reflects: that we are convinced of the existence of these _operations_; ... but he seems to have regarded them as something innate.” A short time before he had said, “We shall see that all the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be innate qualities.”—Traité des Sensations. (Extrait raisonné.) [54] See t. iii. p. 81. [55] T. i. p. 343. [56] “I may now flatter myself,” says he, “that the reader is sufficiently prepared for quite a new philosophy, deduced directly from the fundamental forces.”—T. iii. p. 11. [57] T. iv. p. 327. [58] T. iv. p. 319. [59] T. iv. p. 341. [60] Ibid. [61] Ibid. [62] “Each individual understanding possesses its own proper organ.”—T. iv. p. 341. [63] T. i. p. 230. [64] T. iv. p. 105. [65] See the preceding articles. [66] T. iv. p. 340. “From all these faculties comes at last decision. It is this decision ... which is really will and wishing.”—T. ii. p. 105. [67] T. iv. p. 341. [68] T. iv. p. 269. [69] T. iv. p. 271. [70] T. iv. p. 252. [71] T. iv. p. 252. [72] T. iv. p. 10. [73] T. i. p. 290. [74] T. i. p. 287. [75] Article “Liberté,” Diction. Encyclop. [76] T. iii. p. 155. Such phrases cannot be concluded. [77] T. iii. p. 213. [78] Ibid. 219. [79] “This term, instinct, is applicable,” says he, “to all the fundamental forces.”—T. iv. p. 334. And he does not see that as to the instincts and the understanding all is contrast. Upon this difference of instinct and understanding, see my work De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux, etc. Paris, 1845, 2d edit. [80] It is true that this approximation astonishes him. “The predilection of animals for elevated places depends,” says he, “upon the same parts as pride, which is in man a moral sentiment! Let the reader imagine the astonishment excited in my mind by such a phenomenon.”—T. iii. 311. [81] “Co-existing with the love of war, it (the carnivorous instinct) constitutes the intrepid warrior.”—T. iii. p. 258. “I know a head which, as to the organ of murder, approaches that of Madeline Albert, and the la Bouhours, except only that nature has executed it upon a grander scale. To witness suffering, is for this person to have the keenest enjoyment. Whoever does not love blood, is in his eyes contemptible.”—T. iii. p. 259. The pen refuses to transcribe such things, which fortunately, however, are pure extravagances. [82] “From my reflections it follows that conscience is nothing but a modification, an affection of the moral sense,” (organ.)—T. iv. p. 210. “From all that I have said as to conscience, it follows that it can by no means be regarded as a fundamental quality: that it is really only an affection of the moral sense—or benevolence.”—T. iv. p. 217. [83] T. iii. p. 321. [84] T. iv. p. 272. [85] T. ii. p. 287.