Here the advance was stayed. As early as the 10th of May, General McClellan, well assured of the strength of his foe, and of the nature and place of the opposition that would be made by the rebels, had represented to the War Department the comparative numerical weakness of his army, and the necessity for its reinforcement. Much correspondence now ensued, between him and the President, on this subject. It was General McClellan’s desire to rest his army on the James river, to receive his reinforcements by that channel, and to move on Richmond from that quarter. On the other hand, it was the opinion of the President, and the Secretary-of-War, that his army ought to rest upon the Pamunkey, receive reinforcements by land, if at all, and move on Richmond by means of bridges across the Chickahominy. General McDowell, at the head of between 35,000 and 40,000 men, was, at this time, in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The proper disposition of this force was also a point in controversy between General McClellan and the authorities at the capital. The former requested that McDowell’s troops might be sent to him, and sent by water. The latter dreaded to send them, lest, by so doing, they might uncover the City of Washington, and expose it to a rebel raid. On the part of General McClellan it was urged that no such apprehension need be entertained; that the bulk of the enemy’s forces were massed for the defence of Richmond; that to conquer the rebels there, would be the surest method of securing the safety of Washington; that the presence of McDowell’s corps would so strengthen his hands as to make victory certain; that, should the rebels attempt a raid on Washington, their route would be by way of Gordonsville and Manassas, on which they could readily be checked; and, finally, that the coming of McDowell’s troops by land would render their timely arrival less certain than it would be in the event of their coming by water, while it would equally render them unavailable for the defense of Washington. The opinion of the Government, however, prevailed; and, in the end, the plan of General McClellan’s campaign was materially changed. He had designed to approach Richmond by the east and south. Resting on the Pamunkey, his purpose was now to approach it by the north. This change in the plan of the campaign necessitated the division of his army by the Chickahominy river, and the bridging of that river in many places. On the 18th of May the Secretary-of-War notified him that General McDowell’s corps would be sent forward by land from Fredericksburg, to form a junction with the right wing of the Array of the Potomac. Awaiting this reinforcement, General McClellan employed himself in strengthening his position, and in building the necessary bridges across the Chickahominy. On the 24th of May he was notified that the critical position of General Banks’ troops, consequent upon a sudden raid, by Stonewall Jackson, up the Valley of