the Shenandoah river, had occasioned the recall of General McDowell, and that the Army of the Potomac must proceed without reinforcements. General McClellan has been bitterly censured for his alleged slothfulness and hesitation, at this juncture; nor can it be denied that his advance towards Richmond was made slowly and with extreme caution. It must be remembered, however, that to march through sloughs of mire, in the face of a powerful and well intrenched foe, is far less easy than to advance on paper, and conquer enemies with printers’ ink. This is not a partisan history—its design is simply to record facts and to do justice. Subsequent events have shed much light upon General McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign. That he had not over-estimated the power of the rebel forces, was conclusively shown in the bloody and terrible seven days’ battles. That he was obliged to deviate from his own chosen plan is evident, and is not denied: yet that plan was the same which was ultimately adopted by General Grant, in the final campaign of the war. Richmond when finally taken, was approached from the east and south, and not from the north. General McClellan may have been overcautious; but his tactics were wise, and his patriotism stainless. The following is the language of General McClellan’s Report, as to several essential points: “The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell’s march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of my campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that stream.... “In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundations, it became necessary to construct between Bottom’s Bridge and Mechanicsville, eleven new bridges, all new and difficult, with extensive by-way approaches. “The entire army could, probably, have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day’s supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed.