In order to justify the appropriation of a zone outside of the actual lines of the public space, it must appear that the property is to be made, in some sort, a part of the improvement; and that fact does appear when the control of the debatable zone is sought in order to save the environment of the public place from disfigurement or objectionable use. That end suffices to justify the condemnation of some interest in the zone; and it is well established by the authorities that when the public good requires the appropriation of some interest, the legislature is sole judge of the particular nature of the interest that shall be taken, and may, without being answerable to any court, declare that the interest to be taken shall be a fee simple absolute. A railway company does not require the title, or even the exclusive use, of its entire right-of-way; yet it is not doubted that, in the absence of a constitutional restriction, the legislature might authorize a railway company to take the entire title. In most states, the fee of a street remains in the owner of the property over which the street is laid out under the power of eminent domain; yet there is no question but that the legislature has power to vest the fee in the city. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the case of _Fairchild_ v. _St. Paul_, 46 Minn. 540, where the question was raised whether the city acquired through condemnation proceedings the actual title to the street or only an easement, stated the established principles of the law in the following language: “There is nothing better settled than that, the power of eminent domain being an incident of sovereignty, the time, manner and occasion of its exercise are wholly in the control and discretion of the legislature, except as restrained by the constitution. It rests in the wisdom of the legislature to determine when and in what manner the public necessities require its exercise; and with the reasonableness of the exercise of that discretion the courts will not interfere. As the legislature is the sole judge of the public necessity which requires or renders expedient the exercise of the power of eminent domain, so it is the exclusive judge of the amount of land, and of the estate in land, which the public end to be subserved requires to be taken. * * *