Under appropriate legislation, then, a city could take the absolute fee to any property in which it required an interest for the public use. It is equally well settled that the legislature can authorize the sale of any such land when it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was acquired. The property, it is true, is held in trust for the public, but that trust could be relinquished by authority of the legislature, which represents the public, and the property could then be sold; and the authority to sell such surplus when no longer needed could be contained in the act authorizing the original condemnation. Of such a statute it was said in _Matter of City of Rochester_ 137 N. Y. 243: “It is claimed that this provision is in conflict with the provisions of the constitution respecting the taking of private property for public use, as it in fact authorizes the city to take it for a purpose not public. We think the objection is without merit or substance. Of course, the city could not take private property for the purpose of selling it or dealing in it; but, having once acquired it for a park, and it becoming, in the course of time, unnecessary or useless for that purpose, by the growth of the city or other changes in the situation, a sale in the manner prescribed by the statute would be within the legitimate functions of the city as a municipal corporation, and power to that end, conferred by the legislature at any time, or in the act authorizing the taking, cannot invalidate the delegated right to exercise the power of eminent domain.” The power of the municipality to sell superfluous land under the authority of such a statute could not be challenged at the time of sale. If the title had been acquired, it could be sold. The only question that could be raised would be one in the original condemnation proceeding as to the power to take the land at all. That question would be merely the question of good faith. The petitioner could be made to file plans showing some reasonable need for the property sought to be condemned; and the courts would not permit an obvious abuse of the power of eminent domain either by the state legislature or by any of its agencies. It is believed, however, that no question of abuse or bad faith could arise when the legislature was shown to have authorized, in its sovereign discretion, the taking of the whole title as the most direct and convenient method of controlling the use.