Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
2. Since we have distinguished two principles, the one which is the
first thinking principle (the Intelligence), and the other which is
the second (the Soul), the Principle superior to the first thinking
principle must itself not think. In order to think, it would have to
be Intelligence; to be Intelligence, it would have to think an object;
to be the first thinking principle, it would have to contain this
object. Now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should
possess intelligence, and should think; otherwise it would not only be
intelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus dual, it would not be
the first. On the other hand, intelligence cannot subsist, if there be
not a purely intelligible nature ("being"), which is intelligible for
Intelligence, but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor
intelligible. Indeed, that which is intelligible must be intelligible
for something else. As to Intelligence, its power is quite vain, if it
does not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks;
for it cannot think, if it have no object to think; and it is perfect
only when it possesses this. Now, before thinking, it must by itself
be perfect by nature ("being"). Therefore, the principle through which
intelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks;
consequently, it has no need to think, since, before thinking, it
suffices to itself. It will, therefore, not think.[11]
THE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND PRINCIPLE.
Therefore, the First principle (the One) does not think; the second
(Intelligence) is the first thinking principle; the third (the Soul) is
the second thinking principle. If the first Principle thought, it would
possess an attribute; consequently, instead of occupying the first
rank, it would occupy only the second; instead of being One, it would
be manifold, and would be all the things that it thought; for it would
already be manifold, even if it limited itself to thinking itself.
THE FIRST MUST BE ONE EXCLUSIVELY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE.
3. It might be objected that nothing (in all this) would hinder the
first Principle from being both single and manifold. We will answer
that the manifold needs a single subject. The manifold cannot exist
without the One from which it comes, and in which it is; without the
One which is counted the first outside of other things, and which must
be considered only in itself. Even on the supposition that it co-exists
with other things, it must, none the less, while being taken with the
other things with which it is supposed to co-exist, be considered
as different from them. Consequently, it must not be considered as
co-existing with other things, but be considered as their subject (or,
substrate), and as existing in itself, instead of co-existing with the
other things of which it is the subject.
WITHOUT SOMETHING SIMPLE, NOTHING MANIFOLD COULD EXIST.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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