Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Indeed, that which is identical in things other than the One, may no
doubt be similar to the One, but cannot be the One. The One must exist
alone in itself, thus to be grasped in other things, unless we should
claim that its (nature) consists in subsisting with other things.
Under this hypothesis, there will not exist either anything absolutely
simple, nor anything composite. Nothing absolutely simple will exist,
since that which is simple could not subsist by itself; neither could
anything composite exist, since nothing simple will exist. For if no
simple thing possess existence, if there be no simple unity, subsisting
by itself, which could serve as support to the composite, if none of
these things be capable of existing by itself, let alone communicating
to others, since it does not exist; we must conclude that that which,
of all these things, is composite, could not exist, since it would be
made up out of elements that do not exist, and which are absolutely
nothing. Therefore, if we insist on the existence of the manifold, we
are implying the existence of the One before the manifold. Now since
that which thinks is multiple, the principle that is not manifold will
not think. But as this Principle is the first, then Intelligence and
thought are entities later than the first.
GOOD, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL ARE LIKE LIGHT, SUN AND MOON.
4. As the Good must be simple, and self-sufficient, it has no need
to think. Now that which it does not need could not be within it,
since nothing (that is different from it) exists in it; consequently,
thought does not exist in it (because it is essentially simple[12]).
Besides, the Good is one thing, and Intelligence another; by thinking,
Intelligence takes on the form of Good. Besides, when in two objects
unity is joined to something other than itself, it is not possible that
this unity, which is joined to something else, should be Unity itself.
Unity in itself should exist in itself before this unity was joined
to anything else. For the same reason, unity joined to something else
presupposes absolutely simple Unity, which subsists in itself, and has
nothing of what is found in unity joined to other things. How could
one thing subsist in another if the principle, from which this other
thing is derived, did not have an existence that was independent, and
prior to the rest? What is simple cannot derive anything from any other
source; but what is manifold, or at least indicates plurality, is of
derivative (nature). The Good may be compared to light, Intelligence
to the sun, and the Soul to the moon that derives her light from the
sun. The Soul's intelligence is only borrowed, which intellectualizes
her by coloring her with its light. On the contrary, Intelligence,
in itself, possesses its own light; it is not only light, but it is
essentially luminous. The Principle that illuminates Intelligence and
which is nothing but light, is absolutely simple light, and supplies
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