Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Seen the Supreme, no one who has calls him chance, vi. 8.19 (39-807).
Self autocracy, vi. 8.21 (39-807).
Self-consciousness can exist in a simple principle, v. 3.1 (49-1090).
Self-consciousness consists of becoming intelligence, v. 3.4
(49-1096).
Self-consciousness is not needed by self-sufficient good, vi. 7.38
(38-763).
Self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul,
v. 3.6 (49-1098).
Self-consciousness result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).
Self-control is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263).
Self-control limited by soul's purification, v. 2.5 (19-263).
Self-development, one object of incarnation, v. 8.5 (31-559).
Self-esteem, proper, v. 1.1 (10-173).
Self-existence possessed by essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).
Self-glorified, image of a trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).
Self is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-57).
Self-luminous statues in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).
Self-sufficiency of supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1120).
Self-victory over, mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).
Seminal reason, ii. 6.1 (17-246); iii. 1.8 (3-97).
Seminal reason does not contain order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).
Seminal reason harmonizes with its appearing actualization, vi. 3.16
(44-960).
Seminal reason produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).
Seminal reasons, v. 8.2 (31-553); v. 7.1 (18-252).
Seminal reasons, as qualified matter would be composite and
secondary, vi. 1.29 (42-886).
Seminal reasons, cause of difference of things, v. 7.1 (18-251).
Seminal reasons cause the soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).
Seminal reasons may be contrary to soul's nature, but not to soul,
vi. 7.7 (38-710).
Sensation, v. 1.7 (10-184).
Sensation and memory, iv. 6 (41-829).
Sensation and memory, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1
(41-829).
Sensation as dream of the soul, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6
(26-363).
Sensation cannot distinguish quality differences, vi. 3.17 (44-963).
Sensation cannot reach truth, v. 5.1 (32-576).
Sensations cause of emotion, iv. 4.28 (28-482).
Sensation equivalent to good, i. 4.2 (46-1021).
Sensation depends on sense-shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473).
Sensation, external and internal, i. 1-7 (53-1199).
Sensation implies the feeling soul, i. 1.6 (53-1198).
Sensation, intermediary, demands conceptive thought, iv. 4.23
(28-472).
Sensation is limited to the common integral parts of the universe,
iv. 5.8 (29-529).
Sensation must first be examined, iv. 4.22 (28-472).
Sensation not a soul distraction, iv. 4.25 (28-477).
Sensation not in head, but in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425).
Sensation, psychology of, iv. 3.26 (27-430).
Sensation relayed from organ to directing principle impossible, iv.
7.7 (2-67).
Sensation taken as their guide, Stoic's fault, vi. 1.28 (42-884).
Sensations are actualizations, not only in sight, but in all senses,
iv. 6.3 (41-835).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account