Plutarch's essays and miscellanies, Vol. 5 (of 5) : $b Comprising all his works collected under the title of "Morals"Plutarch
Philosophy
Plutarch's essays and miscellanies, Vol. 5 (of 5) : $b Comprising all his works collected under the title of "Morals"
Plutarch
Classical literature; Essays; Ethics; Philosophy
This (said Sylla) is what I understood from this guest of mine, who
was a stranger and a traveller; and this he said he learned from the
Daemons who served and ministered to Saturn. And you, O Lamprias, may
take my relation in such part as you please.
OF FATE.[109]
I WILL endeavor, my dearest Piso, to send you my opinion concerning
Fate, written with all the clearness and compendiousness I am capable
of; since you, who are not ignorant how cautious I am of writing, have
thought fit to make it the subject of your request.
1. You are first then to know that this word Fate is spoken and
understood two manner of ways; the one as it is an energy, the other
as it is a substance. First therefore, as it is an action, Plato[110]
has under a type described it, saying thus in his dialogue entitled
Phaedrus: “And this is a sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable
ordinance), that whatever soul being an attendant on God,” &c. And
in his treatise called Timaeus: “The laws which God in the nature of
the universe has established for immortal souls.” And in his book of
a Commonweal he calls Fate “the speech of the virgin Lachesis, who is
the daughter of Necessity.” By which sentences he not tragically but
theologically shows us what his sentiments are in this matter. Now if
any one, translating the fore-cited passages, would have them expressed
in more familiar terms, the description in Phaedrus may be thus
explained: That Fate is a divine sentence, intransgressible because
its cause cannot be divested or hindered. And according to what he has
said in his Timaeus, it is a law ensuing on the nature of the universe,
according to which all things that are done are transacted. For this
does Lachesis effect, who is indeed the daughter of Necessity,—as we
have both already related, and shall yet better understand by that
which will be said in the progress of our discourse. Thus you see what
Fate is, when it is taken for an action.
2. But as it is a substance, it seems to be the universal soul of
the world, and admits of a threefold distribution; the first destiny
being that which errs not; the second, that which is thought to err;
and the third that which, being under the heaven, is conversant about
the earth. Of these, the highest is called Clotho, the next Atropos,
and the lowest, Lachesis; who, receiving the celestial influences
and efficacies of her sisters, transmits and fastens them to the
terrestrial things which are under her government. Thus have we
declared briefly what is to be said of Fate, taken as a substance;
what it is, what are its parts, after what manner it is, how it is
ordained, and how it stands, both in respect to itself and to us. But
as to the particularities of these things, there is another fable in
his Commonweal, by which they are in some measure covertly insinuated,
and we ourselves have, in the best manner we can, endeavored to explain
them to you.
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