Mr. E. S. Hartland, in _Folk Lore_, III. ii., has put forward the theory that the practice of sin-eating is the transformed survival of a savage custom of eating deceased kinsmen. Even those who dissent from his conclusion will not be able to deny that the custom does exist among savages, and that the object of cannibalism is to secure to the eater the courage, cunning, strength, &c., of the person eaten; nor will it be denied that on the first movement from savagery a tendency would manifest itself to substitute for the corpse anything which, according to the canons of savage logic, might be regarded as an equivalent substitute. The Italians, regarding beans as human flesh, might, we may conjecture, substitute beans; as the Bavarian peasant substitutes _Leichen-nudeln_. Before, however, we can regard this as anything more than a guess, we want proof that the Italians did really look upon the beans which they ate at funeral feasts as representative of the deceased. That proof is forthcoming, I submit, in the belief mentioned by Pliny (_N. H._, xviii. 30. 2) that "the spirit of the deceased was in the bean" (_mortuorum animæ sint in ea_, _i.e._, in the _faba_). And inasmuch as the law forbade them that would be chaste to eat pulse, it seems probable that the object of eating beans at funeral banquets was to convey the propagating powers of the deceased to his kinsmen. If then the superstition about the bean was borrowed by the Italians, it must have been borrowed in primitive times; and we must think that the belief reached the Italians at the same time as the cultivation of the bean itself spread from its original (unknown) home. But, if we may trust comparative philology, the bean was probably known to the European Aryans before they divided into separate peoples, such as Slavs, Italians, &c. And thus we can catch glimpses of this piece of folk-lore on its travels in pro-ethnic times. But this, I confess, I find it rather hard to believe. Of course, if there were channels of communication by which the plant itself could travel in that "time long past," then by those same channels the superstition might be conveyed. But on the other hand, if one people could see a resemblance between the bean and some part of the human body, so might another. We do not imagine that because some of the taboos laid on the Mikado were the same as some laid on the flamen Dialis, they were therefore borrowed. Why, then, should we resort to the hypothesis of borrowing to account for the fact the flamen of pre-historic times was forbidden, exactly in the same way as the priests of ancient Egypt, to see or name a bean? Folk-lorists will naturally inquire whether any traces of the conceptions and customs we have been examining can be found in fairy-tales.