Watkins places his real faith in a scheme of “constitutional dictatorship.” These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: “The period of dictatorship must be relatively short.... Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character.... Final authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator himself....”[34] The objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be “strict political conservatism.” “Radical social and economic measures may, of course, be necessary as a means of preventing political change.... Boldly inventive as it may be in other directions, however, a truly constitutional dictatorship must always aim at the maintenance of an existing _status quo_ in the field of constitutional law. Deviations from the established norms of political action may be necessary for the time being. The function of a truly constitutional dictatorship is to provide such deviations and at the same time to make sure that they do not go any further than is actually necessary under the circumstances.”[35] Carl J. Friedrich casts his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.[36] It is a problem of concentrating power--in a government where power has consciously been divided--“to cope with ... situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity.[37] There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what end.”[38] Professor Friedrich, too, offers criteria for judging the adequacy of any scheme of emergency powers. The emergency executive (“dictator”) must be appointed by constitutional means--_i.e._, he must be legitimate; he should not himself enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency (and here, strangely enough, he finds the United States and Great Britain conforming to the criterion); emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order.[39] Recognizing that “there are no ultimate institutional safeguards available for insuring that emergency powers be used for the purpose of preserving the constitution” excepting “the people’s own determination to see them so used,” Friedrich nonetheless sees some indefinite but influential role which the courts, even though “helpless in the face of a real emergency,” may play to restrict the use of emergency powers to legitimate goals. They may “act as a sort of keeper of the President’s and the people’s conscience.”[40]