Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the recent history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar Germany, and the United States, reverts to a description of a scheme of “constitutional dictatorship” as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.[41] Like Watkins and Friedrich, he is concerned to state, _a priori_, the conditions of success of the “constitutional dictatorship.” “1. No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the state and its constitutional order.... “2. ... the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator....”[42] “3. No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provision for its termination.... “4. ... all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements.... “5. ... no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis.... “6. The measures adopted in the prosecution of a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect.... “7. The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order.... “8. Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship.... “9. The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one, should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator.... “10. No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted.... “11. ... the termination of the crisis must be followed by as complete a return as possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship....”[43] Rossiter accords to the legislature (in the case of the United States, at any rate) a far greater role in the oversight of executive exercise of emergency powers than does Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency,[44] and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.[45] In this work he offers no clear statement of the proposed relationship of the judiciary to his scheme of “constitutional dictatorship.” In a subsequent study, he concluded on the basis of a critical review of the Supreme Court that it was impotent “as overseer and interpreter of the war powers.”[46] CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCE.