A fourth characteristic of Pragmatism is its notorious “anti-intellectualism,”[130] its hostility to the merely dialectical use of terms and concepts and categories,[131] to argumentation that is unduly detached from the facts and the needs of our concrete human experience. This anti-intellectualism we prefer meantime to consider not so much in itself and on its own account (if this be possible with a negative creed) as in the light of the results it has had upon philosophy. There is, for example, the general clearing of the ground that has undoubtedly taken place as to the actual or the possible meaning of many terms or conceptions that have long been current with the transcendentalists, such as “pure thought,” the “Absolute,” “truth” in and for itself, philosophy as the “completely rational” interpretation of experience, and so on. And along with this clearing of the ground there are (and also in consequence of the pragmatist movement) a great many recent, striking concessions of Rationalism to practical, and to common-sense, ways of looking at things, the very existence of which cannot but have an important effect upon the philosophy of the near future. Among some of the more typical of these are the following: From Mr. F. H. Bradley we have the emphatic declarations that the principle of dialectical opposition or the principle of “Non-Contradiction” (formerly, to himself and his followers, the “rule of the game” in philosophy) “does not settle anything about the nature of reality”; that “truth” is an “hypothesis,” and that “except as a means to a foreign end it is useless and impossible”; and “when we judge truth by its own standard it is defective because it fails to include all the facts,”[132] and because its contents “cannot be made intelligible throughout and entirely”; that “no truth is idle,” and that “all truth” has “practical” and æsthetic “consequences”; that there is “no such existing thing as pure thought”;[133] that we cannot separate truth and practice; that “absolute certainty is not requisite for working purposes”; that it is a “superstition[134] to think that the intellect is the highest part of us,” and that it is well to attack a one-sided “intellectualism”; that both “intellectualism” and “voluntarism” are “one-sided,” and that he has no “objection to identifying reality with goodness or satisfaction, so long as this does not mean merely practical satisfaction.”[135] Then from this same author comes the following familiar statement about philosophy as a whole: “Philosophy always will be hard, and what it promises in the end is no clear vision nor any complete understanding or vision, but its certain reward is a continual and a heightened appreciation [this is the result of science as well as of philosophy] of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexities and all its unity and all its worth.”[136]