Equally typical and equally important is the following concession from Professor Taylor, although, of course, to many people it would seem no concession at all, but rather the mere statement of a fact, which our Neo-Hegelians have only made themselves ridiculous by seeming to have so long overlooked: “Mere truth for the intellect can never be quite the same as ultimate reality. For in mere truth we get reality only in its intellectual aspect, as that which affords a higher satisfaction to thought’s demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object. And as we have seen, this demand can never be quite satisfied by thought itself.[137] For thought, to remain thought, must always be something less than the whole reality which it knows.”[138] And we may add also from Professor Taylor the following declaration in respect of the notorious inability of Neo-Hegelian Rationalism to furnish the average man with a theory of reality in the contemplation of which he can find at least an adequate motive to conscious effort and achievement: “Quite apart from the facts, due to personal shortcomings and confusions, it is inherent in the nature of metaphysical study that it can make no positive addition to our information, and can itself supply no motive for practical endeavour.”[139] Many of those findings are obviously so harmonious with some of the more familiar formulas of the pragmatists that there would seem to be ample warrant for associating them with the results of the pragmatist movement. This is particularly the case, it would seem, with the concession of Mr. Bradley with respect of the “practical” or “hypothetical” conception that we ought to entertain of “truth” and “thinking,” and also with the strictures passed by him upon “mere truth” and “mere intellectualism,” and with Professor Taylor’s position in respect of the inadequacy of the rationalist theory of reality, as in no sense a “dynamic” or an “incentive” for action. And we might well regard Professor Taylor’s finding in respect of mere systematic truth or the “Absolute” (for they are the same thing to him) as confirmatory of Dr. Schiller’s important contention that “in Absolutism” the two “poles” of the “moral” and the “intellectual” character of the Deity “fall apart.” This means, we will remember, that the truth of abstract intellectualism is not the truth for action,[140] that absolutism is not able to effect or harmonize between the truth of systematic knowledge and moral truth--if, indeed, there be any such thing as moral truth on the basis of a pure Rationalism.