Similarily Pragmatism would protest, as does the newer education and the newer sociology, against any merely _doctrinaire_ (or “intellectualistic”) conception of education and culture, substituting in its place the “efficiency” or the “social service”[187] conception. And even if we must admit that this more or less practical ideal of education has been over-emphasized in our time, it is still true, as with Goethe, that it is only the “actively-free” man, the man who can work out in service and true accomplishment the ideal of human life, whose production should be regarded as the aim of a sound educational or social policy. We shall later attempt to assign some definite reasons for the failure of Pragmatism to make the most of all this apparently justifiable insistence upon action and upon the creative activity of the individual, along with all this sympathy that it seems to evince for a progressive and a liberationist view of human policy. Meantime, in view of all these considerations, we cannot avoid making the reflection that it is surely something of an anomaly in philosophy that a thinker’s “study” doubts about his actions and about some of the main instinctive beliefs of mankind (in which he himself shares) should have come to be regarded--as they have been by Rationalism--as considerations of a greater importance than the actions, and the beliefs, and the realities, of which they are the expression. Far be it from the writer to suggest that the suspension of judgment and the refraining from activity,[188] in the absence of adequate reason and motive, are not, and have not been of the greatest value to mankind in the matter of the development of the higher faculties and the higher ideals of the mind. There may well be, however, for Pragmatism, or for any philosophy that can work it out satisfactorily, in the free, creative, activity of man, in the duty that lies upon us all of carrying on our lives to the highest expression, a reason and a truth that must be estimated at their logical worth along with the many other reasons and truths of which we are pleased to think as the truth of things. Short, however, of a more genuine attempt on the part of Pragmatism than anything it has as yet given us in this connexion to justify this higher reason and truth that are embodied in our consciousness of ourselves as persons, as _rational agents_, all its mere “practicalism” and all its “instrumentalism” are but the workaday and the utilitarian philosophy of which we have already complained in its earlier and cruder professions.[189] After some attention, then, to the matter of the outstanding critical defects of Pragmatism, in its preliminary and cruder forms, we shall again return to our topic of the relatively new subject-matter it has been endeavouring to place before philosophy in its insistence upon the importance of action, and upon the need of a “dynamic,” instead of an intellectualistic and “spectator-like” theory of human personality.