seem to afford us some warrant for trying to think of what might be called a newer or ethical idealism, an idealism of the will, an idealism of life, in contradistinction to the older or intellectual (epistemological, Neo-Kantian) idealism, the idealism of the intellect. Professor A. Seth,[198] in his recent volume on _Man’s Place in the Cosmos_, suggests that Mr. Bradley’s treatise on _Appearance and Reality_ has closed the period of the absorption or assimilation of Kanto-Hegelian principles by the English mind. And there is ample evidence in contemporary philosophical literature to show that even the very men who have, with the help of Stirling and Green and Caird and Bradley and Wallace, “absorbed and assimilated” the principles of critical idealism are now bent upon applying these principles to the solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct. Two things alone would constitute a difference between the philosophy of the last few years and that of the preceding generation: An attempt (strongly[199] accentuated at the present moment) to include elements of _feeling_ and _will_ in our final consciousness of reality, and a tendency (inevitable since Comte and Hegel’s _Philosophy of History_) to extend the philosophical synthesis of the merely “external,” or physical, universe so as to make it include the world of man’s action and the world that is now glibly called the “social organism.”[200] A good deal of the epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of this century has been merely cosmological, and at best psychological and individualistic. The philosophy of the present is, necessarily, to a large extent, sociological and collectivistic and historical. Renan once prophesied that this would be so. And many other men perceived the same fact and acted upon their perception of it--Goethe and Victor Hugo and Carlyle, for example.