reality, the Each-form, is logically as acceptable and empirical and probable as the All-form.” This is the theory of the outspoken “radical empiricism”[15] which is the contention of the volume upon _The Meaning of Truth_, the main effort of which seems to be to show again that the world is still in the process of making. It has the additional drawback of bringing Pragmatism down not only to the level of radical empiricism, but to that of common-sense realism or dualism [the belief in the two independent realities of matter and mind], and to that of the “copy-theory”[16] of truth, from which both Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism are especially supposed to deliver us. “I will say here again, for the sake of emphasis, that the existence of the object ... is the only reason, in innumerable cases, why the idea does work successfully.... Both Dewey and I hold firmly ... to objects independent of our own judgments.”[17] Much of all this is, no doubt, like surrendering philosophy altogether. In the case of Dr. Schiller, we may notice first his frequent and successful exhibition of the extent to which human activity enters into the constitution not only of “truth,” but of “reality,” of what we mean by reality. This is interwoven in his books with his whole philosophy of truth as something merely human, as “dependent upon human purposes,” as a “valuation” expressive of the satisfactory, or the unsatisfactory, nature of the contents of “primary reality.” It is interwoven, too, with his doctrine that reality is essentially a ὕλη, something that is still in the making, something that human beings can somehow re-make and make perfect. Then this position about truth and reality is used by him, as by James, as a ground of attack against Absolutism, with its notion of a “pre-existing ideal” of knowledge and reality, as already existing in a super-sensible world, that descends magically into the passively recipient soul of man. There is no such thing, he claims, as absolute truth, and the conception of an “absolute reality” is both futile and pernicious. Absolutism, too, has an affinity to Solipsism,[18] the difficulties of which it can escape only by self-elimination.