Then Absolutism is, Schiller continues, “essentially irreligious,”[19] although it was fostered at first in England for essentially religious purposes.[20] It has developed there now at last, he reminds us, a powerful left[21] wing which, as formerly in Germany, has opened a quarrel with theology. In Absolutism, the two phases of Deity--God as moral principle, and God as an intellectual principle--“fall apart,” and absolutist metaphysic has really no connexion with genuine religion. Humanism can “renew Hegelianism” by treating the making of truth as also the making of reality. Freedom is real, and may possibly “pervade the universe.”[22] All truth implies belief, and it is obviously one of the merits of Pragmatism to bring truth and reason together. Beliefs and ideas and wishes are really essential and integral features in real knowing, and if knowing, as above, really transforms our experience, they must be treated as “real forces,” which cannot be ignored by philosophy.[23] Against all this would-be positive, or constructive, philosophy we must, however, record the fact that the pragmatism of Dr. Schiller breaks down altogether in the matter of the recognition of a distinction between the “discovering” of reality and the “making” of reality. And despite the ingenuity of his essay in the first edition of _Humanism_ upon “Activity and Substance,”[24] there is not in his writings, any more than in those of James, any coherent or adequate theory of reality. And this is the case whether we think of the “primary reality” upon which we human beings are said to “react,” in our knowledge and in our action, or of the supreme reality of God’s existence, of which such an interesting speculative account is given in the essay referred to. Nor is there in Dr. Schiller, any more than in James, any adequate conception, either of philosophy as a whole, or of the theory of knowledge, or of the relation of Pragmatism as a “method” (it is modestly claimed to be only such, but the position is not adhered to) to philosophy as such.[25] “For the pragmatic theory of knowledge initial principles are literally ἀρχαί, mere starting-points variously, arbitrarily, casually selected, from which we hope to try to advance to something better. Little we care what their credentials may be.... And as far as the future is concerned, systems of philosophy will abound as before, and will be as various as ever, but they will probably be more brilliant in colouring and more attractive in their form, for they will certainly have to be put forward and acknowledged as works of art that bear the impress of a unique and individual soul.”[26]