(74.) As the mind exists not in the place of sensible objects, and
is not brought into immediate relation with them, we can only regard
sensible impressions as signals conveyed from them by a wonderful, and,
to us, inexplicable mechanism, to our minds, which receives and reviews
them, and, by habit and association, connects them with corresponding
qualities or affections in the objects; just as a person writing down
and comparing the signals of a telegraph might interpret their meaning.
As, for instance, if he had constantly observed that the exhibition of
a certain signal was sure to be followed next day by the announcement
of the arrival of a ship at Portsmouth, he would connect the two facts
by a link of the very same nature with that which connects the notion
of a large wooden building, filled with sailors, with the impression of
her outline on the retina of a spectator on the beach.
(75.) In captain Head’s amusing and vivid description of his journey
across the Pampas of South America occurs an anecdote quite in point.
His guide one day suddenly stopped him, and, pointing high into the
air, cried out, “A lion!” Surprised at such an exclamation, accompanied
with such an act, he turned up his eyes, and with difficulty perceived,
at an immeasurable height, a flight of condors soaring in circles in
a particular spot. Beneath that spot, far out of sight of himself or
guide, lay the carcass of a horse, and over that carcass stood (as the
guide well knew) the lion, whom the condors were eyeing with envy from
their airy height. The signal of the birds was to him what the sight of
the lion alone could have been to the traveller, a full assurance of
its existence.
CHAP. II.
OF THE ANALYSIS OF PHENOMENA
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