=73.= One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar type--that in which subject and predicate are both existents. 123 =74.= But ethical propositions cannot be reduced to this type: in particular, they are obviously to be distinguished 125 =75.= (1) from Natural Laws; with which one of Kant’s most famous doctrines confuses them, 126 =76.= and (2) from Commands; with which they are confused both by Kant and by others. 127 D. =77.= This latter confusion is one of the sources of the prevalent modern doctrine that ‘being good’ is _identical_ with ‘being willed’; but the prevalence of this doctrine seems to be chiefly due to other causes. I shall try to shew with regard to it (1) what are the chief errors which seem to have led to its adoption; and (2) that, apart from it, the Metaphysics of Volition can hardly have the smallest logical bearing upon Ethics. 128 =78.= (1) It has been commonly held, since Kant, that ‘goodness’ has the same relation to Will or Feeling, which ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ has to Cognition: that the proper method for Ethics is to discover what is _implied_ in Will or Feeling, just as, according to Kant, the proper method for Metaphysics was to discover what is _implied_ in Cognition. 129 =79.= The actual relations between ‘goodness’ and Will or Feeling, from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to be mainly (_a_) the _causal_ relation consisting in the fact that it is only by reflection upon the experiences of Will and Feeling that we become aware of ethical distinctions; (_b_) the facts that a cognition of goodness is perhaps _always_ included in certain kinds of Willing and Feeling, and is _generally_ accompanied by them: 130 =80.= but from neither of these _psychological_ facts does it follow that ‘to be good’ is identical with being willed or felt in a certain way: the supposition that it does follow is an instance of the fundamental contradiction of modern Epistemology--the contradiction involved in both distinguishing and identifying the _object_ and the _act_ of Thought, ‘truth’ itself and its supposed _criterion_: 131 =81.= and, once this analogy between Volition and Cognition is accepted, the view that ethical propositions have an essential reference to Will or Feeling, is strengthened by another error with regard to the nature of Cognition--the error of supposing that ‘perception’ denotes _merely_ a certain way of cognising an object, whereas it actually includes the assertion that the object is also _true_. 133