=82.= The argument of the last three §§ is recapitulated; and it is pointed out (1) that Volition and Feeling are _not_ analogous to Cognition, (2) that, even if they were, still ‘to be good’ could not _mean_ ‘to be willed or felt in a certain way.’ 135 =83.= (2) If ‘being good’ and ‘being willed’ are not _identical_, then the latter could only be a _criterion_ of the former; and, in order to shew that it was so, we should have to establish _independently_ that many things were good--that is to say, we should have to establish most of our ethical conclusions, before the Metaphysics of Volition could possibly give us the smallest assistance. 137 =84.= The fact that the metaphysical writers who, like Green, attempt to _base_ Ethics on Volition, do not even attempt this independent investigation, shews that they start from the false assumption that goodness is _identical_ with being willed, and hence that their ethical reasonings have no value whatsoever. 138 =85.= Summary of chapter. 139 CHAPTER V. ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT. =86.= The question to be discussed in this chapter must be clearly distinguished from the two questions hitherto discussed, namely (1) What is the nature of the proposition: ‘This is good in itself’? 142 =87.= and (2) What things are good in themselves? to which we gave one answer in deciding that pleasure was not the only thing good in itself. 144 =88.= In this chapter we shall deal with the _third_ object of ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question ‘What conduct is a _means_ to good results?’ or ‘What ought we to do?’ This is the question of _Practical_ Ethics, and its answer involves an assertion of _causal_ connection. 146 =89.= It is shewn that the assertions ‘This action is right’ or ‘is my duty’ are equivalent to the assertion that the total results of the action in question will be the best possible; 146 =90.= and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain conclusions, upon which light is thrown by this fact. Of which the first is (1) that Intuitionism is mistaken; since no proposition with regard to duty can be self-evident. 148 =91.= (2) It is plain that we cannot hope to prove which among all the actions, which it is possible for us to perform on every occasion, will produce the best total results: to discover what is our ‘duty,’ in this strict sense, is impossible. It may, however, be possible to shew which among the actions, which we are _likely_ to perform, will produce the best results. 149