=104.= It follows also that we have no reason to presume, as has commonly been done, that the exercise of virtue in the performance of ‘duties’ is ever good in itself--far less, that it is the sole good: 173 =105.= and, if we consider the intrinsic value of such exercise, it will appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no value, and (2) that even the cases, where it has some value, are far from constituting the sole good. The truth of the latter proposition is generally inconsistently implied, even by those who deny it; 174 =106.= but in order fairly to decide upon the intrinsic value of virtue, we must distinguish three different kinds of disposition, each of which is commonly so called and has been maintained to be the only kind deserving the name. Thus (_a_) the mere unconscious ‘habit’ of performing duties, which is the commonest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian moralists are right in implying that mere ‘external rightness’ has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it is therefore not ‘virtuous,’ since this implies that it has no value even as a means: 175 =107.= (_b_) where virtue consists in a disposition to have, and be moved by, a sentiment of love towards really good consequences of an action and of hatred towards really evil ones, it has some intrinsic value, but its value may vary greatly in degree: 177 =108.= finally (_c_) where virtue consists in ‘conscientiousness,’ _i.e._ the disposition not to act, in certain cases, until we believe and feel that our action is right, it seems to have some intrinsic value: the value of this feeling has been peculiarly emphasized by Christian Ethics, but it certainly is not, as Kant would lead us to think, either the sole thing of value, or always good even as a means. 178 =109.= Summary of chapter. 180 CHAPTER VI. THE IDEAL. =110.= By an ‘ideal’ state of things may be meant either (1) the Summum Bonum or absolutely best, or (2) the best which the laws of nature allow to exist in this world, or (3) anything greatly good in itself: this chapter will be principally occupied with what is ideal in sense (3)--with answering the fundamental question of Ethics; 183 =111.= but a correct answer to this question is an essential step towards a correct view as to what is ‘ideal’ in senses (1) and (2). 184 =112.= In order to obtain a correct answer to the question ‘What is good in itself?’ we must consider what value things would have if they existed absolutely by themselves; 187