=113.= and, if we use this method, it is obvious that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest goods with which we are acquainted. 188 =114.= If we begin by considering I. _Aesthetic Enjoyments_, it is plain (1) that there is always _essential_ to these some one of a great variety of different emotions, though these emotions may have little value _by themselves_: 189 =115.= and (2) that a cognition of really beautiful qualities is equally essential, and has equally little value by itself. 190 =116.= But (3) granted that the appropriate combination of these two elements is always a considerable good and may be a very great one, we may ask whether, where there is _added_ to this _a true belief in the existence of the object of the cognition_, the whole thus formed is not much more valuable still. 192 =117.= I think that this question should be answered in the affirmative; but in order to ensure that this judgment is correct, we must carefully distinguish it 194 =118.= from the two judgments (_a_) that knowledge is valuable _as a means_, (_b_) that, where the object of the cognition is itself a good thing, its existence, of course, adds to the value of the whole state of things: 195 =119.= if, however, we attempt to avoid being biassed by these two facts, it still seems that mere true belief may be a condition essential to great value. 197 =120.= We thus get a _third_ essential constituent of many great goods; and in this way we are able to justify (1) the attribution of value to _knowledge_, over and above its value as a means, and (2) the intrinsic superiority of the proper appreciation of a _real_ object over the appreciation of an equally valuable object of mere imagination: emotions directed towards real objects may thus, even if the object be inferior, claim equality with the highest imaginative pleasures. 198 =121.= Finally (4) with regard to the _objects_ of the cognition which is essential to these good wholes, it is the business of Aesthetics to analyse their nature: it need only be here remarked (1) that, by calling them ‘beautiful,’ we mean that they have this relation to a _good_ whole; and (2) that they are, for the most part, themselves complex wholes, such that the admiring contemplation of the whole greatly exceeds in value the sum of the values of the admiring contemplation of the parts. 200