=131.= but (2) That a whole which includes a cognition of something evil or ugly may yet be a great positive good _on the whole_: most virtues, which have any intrinsic value whatever, seem to be of this kind, _e.g._ (_a_) courage and compassion, and (_b_) moral goodness; all these are instances of the hatred or contempt of what is evil or ugly; 216 =132.= but there seems no reason to think that, where the evil object _exists_, the total state of things is ever positively good _on the whole_, although the existence of the evil may add to its value _as a whole_. 219 =133.= Hence (1) no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal, (2) the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it, and (3) where evils already exist, the existence of mixed virtues has a value independent both of its consequences and of the value which it has in common with the proper appreciation of imaginary evils. 220 =134.= Concluding remarks. 222 =135.= Summary of chapter. 224 CHAPTER I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS. =1.= It is very easy to point out some among our every-day judgments, with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, ‘So and so is a good man,’ or ‘That fellow is a villain’; whenever we ask, ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘Is it wrong for me to do like this?’; whenever we hazard such remarks as ‘Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice’--it is undoubtedly the business of Ethics to discuss such questions and such statements; to argue what is the true answer when we ask what it is right to do, and to give reasons for thinking that our statements about the character of persons or the morality of actions are true or false. In the vast majority of cases, where we make statements involving any of the terms ‘virtue,’ ‘vice,’ ‘duty,’ ‘right,’ ‘ought,’ ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ we are making ethical judgments; and if we wish to discuss their truth, we shall be discussing a point of Ethics. So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory.