Despite all differences in the impulses concerned, a certain general similarity can be observed in all these cases of supremely fine and complete organisation. It is this similarity which has led to the legends of the ‘æsthetic state’, the ‘æsthetic emotion’ and the single quality Beauty, the same in all its manifestations. We had occasion in Chapter II to suggest that the characteristics by which æsthetic experience is usually defined—that impersonality, disinterestedness and detachment so much stressed and so little discussed by æstheticians—are really two sets of quite different characters. One set we have seen (Chapters X and XXIV) to be merely conditions of communication having nothing essentially to do with value, conditions involved in valueless and valuable communications alike. We have suggested above, however, that this kind of detachment and severance from ordinary circumstances and accidental personal interests may be of special service in these supremely valuable[81] communications, since it makes the breaking down of inhibitions more easy. This same facilitation of response is also, it should be added, the explanation of the peculiarly pernicious effect of bad but competent art. We may now turn to consider that other set of characters which have been confused with these communicative conditions, and which may justifiably be taken as defining a special field for those interested in the values of experience. There are two ways in which impulses may be organised; by exclusion and by inclusion, by synthesis and by elimination. Although every coherent state of mind depends upon both, it is permissible to contrast experiences which win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with those which widen it. A very great deal of poetry and art is content with the full, ordered development of comparatively special and limited experiences, with a definite emotion, for example, Sorrow, Joy, Pride, or a definite attitude, Love, Indignation, Admiration, Hope, or with a specific mood, Melancholy, Optimism or Longing. And such art has its own value and its place in human affairs. No one will quarrel with ‘Break, break, break,’ or with the _Coronach_ or with _Rose Aylmer_ or with _Love’s Philosophy_,[82] although clearly they are limited and exclusive. But they are not the greatest kind of poetry; we do not expect from them what we find in the _Ode to the Nightingale_, in _Proud Maisie_, in _Sir Patrick Spens_, in _The Definition of Love_ or in the _Nocturnall upon S. Lucie’s Day_.