Principles of literary criticismRichards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Philosophy
Principles of literary criticism
Richards, I. A. (Ivor Armstrong)
Criticism
The structures of these two kinds of experiences are different,
and the difference is not one of subject but of the relations
_inter se_ of the several impulses active in the experience.
A poem of the first group is built out of sets of impulses which
run parallel, which have the same direction. In a poem of the
second group the most obvious feature is the extraordinarily
heterogeneity of the distinguishable impulses. But they are more
than heterogeneous, they are opposed. They are such that in ordinary,
non-poetic, non-imaginative experience, one or other set would
be suppressed to give as it might appear freer development to
the others.
The difference comes out clearly if we consider how comparatively
unstable poems of the first kind are. They will not bear an ironical
contemplation. We have only to read _The War Song of Dinas Vawr_ in
close conjunction with the _Coronach_, or to remember that unfortunate
phrase ‘Those lips, O slippery blisses’! from _Endymion_, while reading
_Love’s Philosophy_, to notice this. Irony in this sense consists in
the bringing in of the opposite, the complementary impulses; that is
why poetry which is exposed to it is not of the highest order, and why
irony itself is so constantly a characteristic of poetry which is.
These opposed impulses from the resolution of which such experiences
spring cannot usually be analysed. When, as is most often the
case, they are aroused through formal means, it is evidently
impossible to do so. But sometimes, as in the above cited cases,
they can, and through this accident literary criticism is able
to go a step further than the criticism of the other arts.
We can only conjecture dimly what difference holds between a
balance and reconciliation of impulses and a mere rivalry or
conflict. One difference is that a balance sustains one state
of mind, but a conflict two alternating states. This, however,
does not take us very far. The chief misconception which prevents
progress here is the switchboard view of the mind. What conception
should be put in its place is still doubtful, but we have already
(Chapters XIV and XX) discussed the reasons which make a more
adequate conception imperative. The rest of the difficulty is
due merely to ignorance; we do not yet know enough about the
central nervous system.
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