In attempting to form some conception of the processes by which bodily characteristics are transmitted, or--to avoid that confusing metaphor of "transmission"--how it comes about that the offspring can grow to resemble its parent, continuity of the germ-substance which in some animals is a visible phenomenon,[2] gives at least apparent help. An egg for example on becoming adult develops in certain parts a particular pigment. The eggs of that adult when they reach the appropriate age develop the same pigment. We have no clear picture of the mechanism by which this process is effected, but when we realise that the pigment results from the interaction of certain substances, and that since all the eggs are in reality pieces of the same material, it seems, unless we inquire closely, not unnatural that the several pieces of the material should exhibit the same colours at the same periods of their development. The continuity of the material of the germs suggests that there is a continuity of the materials from which the pigment is formed, and that thus an actual bit of those substances passes into each egg ready at the appropriate moment to generate the pigment. The argument thus outlined applies to all _substantive_ characteristics. In each case we can imagine, if we will, the appearance of that characteristic as due to the contribution of its rudiment from the germ tissues. When we consider more critically it becomes evident that the aid given by this mental picture is of very doubtful reality, for even if it were true that any predestined particle actually corresponding with the pigment-forming materials is definitely passed on from germ to germ, yet the power of increase which must be attributed to it remains so incomprehensible that the mystery is hardly at all illuminated. When however we pass from the substantive to the meristic characters, the conception that the character depends on the possession by the germ of a particle of a specific material becomes even less plausible. Hardly by any effort of imagination can we see any way by which the division of the vertebral column into _x_ segments or into _y_ segments, or of a Medusa into 4 segments or into 6, can be determined by the possession or by the want of a material particle. The distinction must surely be of a different order. If we are to look for a physical analogy at all we should rather be led to suppose that these differences in segmental numbers corresponded with changes in the amplitude or number of dividing waves than with any change in the substance or material divided. PHENOMENA OF DIVISION