Socrates in his enquiry uses not one abstract term for religion—the Greeks have in fact no one word that covers the whole field—he uses two[5], piety (τὸ εὐσεβές) and holiness (τὸ ὅσιον). Euthyphron of course begins with cheerful confidence: he and all other respectable men know quite well what piety and holiness are. He willingly admits that ‘holiness is a part of justice,’ that part of justice that appertains to the gods; it is giving the gods their due. He also allows, not quite seeing to what the argument is tending, that piety and holiness are ‘a sort of tendance (θεραπεία) of the gods.’ This ‘tendance,’ Socrates presses on, ‘must be of the nature of service or ministration,’ and Euthyphron adds that it is the sort of service that servants shew their masters. Socrates wants to know in what particular work and operation the gods need help and ministration. Euthyphron answers with some impatience that, to put it plainly and cut the matter short, holiness consists in ‘a man understanding how to do what is pleasing to the gods in word and deed, i.e. by prayer and sacrifice.’ Socrates eagerly seizes his advantage and asks: ‘You mean then that holiness is a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?’ ‘Further,’ he adds, ‘sacrifice is giving to the gods, prayer is asking of them, holiness then is a science of asking and giving.’ If we give to the gods they must want something of us, they must want to ‘do business with us.’ ‘Holiness is then an art in which gods and men do business with each other.’ So Socrates triumphantly concludes, to the manifest discomfort of Euthyphron, who however can urge no tenable objection. He feels as a pious man that the essence of the service or tendance he owes to the gods is of the nature of a freewill tribute of honour, but he cannot deny that the gods demand this as a _quid pro quo_.