[25] See Carl J. Friedrich, _The New Belief in the Common Man_, Brattleboro (Vermont), 1945, chapter III, "Independence of Thought and Propaganda," pp. 81-120, for a cogent discussion of this mentality. The present author, in _Government in Republican China_, New York, 1938, pp. 18-23, describes in epitome the method whereby the ancient Confucian leadership of China, while propaganda-conscious, used ideology as an economical, stable method of control and avoided its maleficent features. In one of the few poorly argued passages of a great work, Arnold J. Toynbee overlooks this peculiar characteristic of Confucianism and merely equates the Confucian dogma with those of other "universal churches" (_A Study of History_, London, 1939, vol. V, especially pages 654-5). [26] People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., _Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotzkyite Centre ..., Verbatim Report_, Moscow, 1937, page 111. These trials were themselves propaganda; in this particular instance, propaganda of a rather poor order, since they failed to convince the foreign public and presumably persuaded only those portions of the Russian public who were so gullible that they needed no further persuading. For a brilliant illumination of them in terms of a readable novel, see Arthur Koestler, _Darkness at Noon_, New York, 1941; the same author also has a book of essays on the totalitarian mentality under the rather fancy title, _The Yogi and the Commissar_, New York, 1945. On the same subject, see Louis Fischer's _Men and Politics_, New York, 1942. [27] This document establishing the COI, along with the other major documents pertaining to American psychological warfare, may be found in J. P. Warburg's book cited above, _Unwritten Treaty_. [28] In the course of a routine day of work on overseas propaganda in 1942, the author, who was then in SSG of MIS, found it necessary to get in touch with Military Intelligence proper, Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the office of the Assistant to the President, the Office of Facts and Figures, the British Political Warfare group (which was vainly seeking its American opposite number), the Office of Civilian Defense, the Research and Analysis Branch of the office of the Coordinator of Information, the office of the Librarian of Congress, the Foreign Information Service, and the Department of Agriculture. Each of these either operated propaganda, or had policy or intelligence contributions to make. The Board of Economic Warfare naturally came into the field too. This was during a period of German and Japanese victories, so that even if propaganda had been coordinated, it probably would not have been much more effective than it was. From what could be figured out later, no real harm was done at this time. Nor was much achieved.