=Definition of the Enemy.= Another significant connection between politics and propaganda is found in definition of _the nature of the enemy_. For combat operations, it is easy (most of the time) to tell who the enemy is; he is the man with the other uniform, the foreign language, the funny color or physique. For psychological operations, it is not that easy. The sound psychological warfare operator will try to get enemy troops to believing that the enemy is not themselves but somebody else--the King, the Führer, the élite troops, the capitalists. He creates a situation in which he can say, "We're not fighting _you_." (This should not be said too soon after extensive use of bombs or mortars.) "We are fighting the So-and-so's who are misleading you." Some of the handsomest propaganda of World War II was produced by the Soviet experts along this line. Before the War was over, Soviet propaganda created a whole gallery of heel-clicking reactionary German generals _on the Russian side_, and made out that the unprofessional guttersnipe Hitler was ruining the wonderful German Army in amateurish campaigns. Joseph Stalin's ringing words, "The German State and the German _Volk_ remain!" gave the Russians a propaganda loophole by which they implied that Germany was not the enemy--no, not Germany! just the Nazis. This was superb psychological warfare, since the Russians had already built up the propaganda thesis that the common people (workers and peasants) were automatically--by virtue of their class loyalty--on the side of the workers' country, Russia. That left very few Germans on the other side. For psychological warfare purposes, it is useful to define the enemy as: (1) the ruler; (2) or the ruling group; (3) or unspecified manipulators; (4) or any definite minority. It is thoroughly unsound to define the enemy too widely. On the other hand, too narrow a definition will leave the enemy the opening for a peace offensive if the ruler dies, or if the ruling group changes part of its composition. It was fear of a peace move by the German generals, plus the desire to maintain the precarious anti-German unity of the occupied countries, which led the United States and Britain to adopt the policy of defining the German Reich rather than Naziism as the enemy. In the instance of Japan, we defined the enemy as the militarists and "Fascists," with the capitalists a poor second, and left the Emperor and people with whom to make peace. If the psychological warfare campaign is operated for a definite political purpose, it is possible for politics to be an aid rather than a limitation. The operator can describe his own political system in its most radiant light. He can say complimentary things about the enemy leaders or groups who might come over (though he should avoid giving them the kiss of death which the Nazis gave certain prominent American isolationists, by praising them too much). He can promise his own brand of Utopia.