The capital of English railways amounts to upwards of £800,000,000. One of the problems to be considered is how to raise a revenue sufficient to pay on this sum even a moderate rate of interest? The Companies might perhaps obtain it by charging for conveyance according to equal mileage rates or according to cost of service. Following such a course they might probably levy charges which a great portion of the traffic would not bear; they might charge, for example, as much for a consignment of pig iron as for a consignment of copper of equal weight carried equal distances--which is generally what cost of service implies. If their sole object were to obtain the necessary revenue, they might cease to regard the effect of rates upon the interests of traders, districts, or ports, and, while conforming to the statutory maximum, they might levy rates detrimental to particular kinds of traffic. Their practice has been altogether different: they have sought to give full effect to the intention which Parliament had in view in framing the rude statutory classifications. They have endeavoured to suit the charges to the capacity of the traders, and in the words of Section 90 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, “To accommodate them (the rates) to the circumstances of the traffic.” Such is the only sound principle working to the interest alike of railways and their customers. If rates were too high, and the traffic could not bear them, traders would suffer; the companies themselves would also suffer; their traffic would diminish, or would not expand as it might do. Such was the principle, speaking generally, on which the classification in railway Acts was framed. Such, too, is the principle of existing rates, only instead of being an hypothesis as to what will suit particular kinds of traffic, the existing classification and rates are based on facts carefully ascertained, verified by long experience, and corrected from time to time.