had but a hazy idea; of the art of government he understood nothing. He believed in the value of words, and imagined that he could establish in Russia an ideal State, living upon ideal principles. But at one time he was popular, and people thought him a strong man, whilst he was only an eloquent demagogue. With this he had an overbearing character, would not admit contradiction, and soon was at variance with his colleagues in the ministry, who, unfortunately for Russia, were as weak as he was himself but with less tyrannical dispositions; they retired when they found that they could not prevent him from carrying out his plans of reforming the army and of abolishing its military discipline, without which no troops in the world could be expected to stand bravely in presence of an attacking foe. It is a thousand pities that men like Paul Milyukoff, Prince George Lvoff, Rodzianko and others, to whose initiative was due the success of the Revolution, allowed themselves to be overruled by Kerensky, until he was left alone to bear upon his shoulders the whole burden of the government and the whole responsibility of the war, when he collapsed like a weak reed at the first real attack directed against him. [Illustration: _Copyright, Underwood & Underwood, N. Y._ KERENSKY INSPIRING TROOPS TO SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT] Another misfortune connected with the government that replaced that of Nicholas II. was that it failed to recognise the terrible German propaganda that was carried on with renewed energy in Russia after the Revolution. It would not believe in its danger, and it could not bring itself to employ violence to put an end to the Socialist or, rather, anarchist agitation fomented by German intrigues and kept up by German money, which alone has rendered possible the triumph of Bolschevikism and the seizure of supreme power by people such as Lenine, Trotzky, Kameneff, and other personalities of the same kind, and the same doubtful or, rather, not doubtful reputation.