Afghan Wars; Crimean War, 1853-1856; Egypt -- History -- British occupation, 1882-1936; India -- History -- Sepoy Rebellion, 1857-1858
The great energy and activity of the allies during the fortnight since
Pélissier had been in command of the French army and in full accord
with Lord Raglan had thus been attended with important results, not
only on the Chernaya and at Kertch, but also in depriving the enemy of
the outworks in front of the city which they had established during
the previous winter. Within a day or two of the successful actions of
June 7, another meeting took place of the senior artillery and engineer
officers of the two armies, at which I was present with General
Dacres. The subject considered had reference to the arrangements in
the trenches necessary for the further prosecution of the siege.
Opinions rather differed, some considering that in view of the recent
success, and its moral effect on the Russians, a general assault should
speedily follow. Colonel Frossard, a distinguished engineer of the
French army, however, urged that as we were still at a distance of some
hundred yards from the Malakoff and Redan we should continue to advance
cautiously by means of sap and trench as heretofore. He pointed out
that an assault from our present position would involve the carrying of
scaling ladders and woolbags to fill the ditches, for a considerable
distance in the open under heavy fire, and that under all the
circumstances we might be liable to defeat in assaulting prematurely.
General Dacres entirely concurred in the views of Colonel Frossard, and
the event proved that their misgivings were justified.
Some days passed away, during which time the batteries in the trenches
were augmented and again prepared for a fresh effort, and it was
finally decided that a general assault should be made on the Malakoff
and Redan on June 18, to be preceded by a vigorous bombardment at
daylight for two or three hours, so as to smash and silence the enemy's
batteries and open a road for the attacking columns. It is important,
however, to bear in mind that General Pélissier declined to make a
simultaneous movement against the Bastion du Mât. A heavy fire was
opened at daylight on June 17 from the English and French trenches,
and continued throughout the day. In the evening Lord Raglan sent for
me, and directed orders to be issued at once to all the batteries,
that the renewed bombardment at daylight the next morning was not to
be carried out. I ventured to remark that every preparation had been
made, and that it would not only be a great disappointment to the navy
and artillery, but it seemed to me that a concentrated fire for two or
three hours on the points to be assaulted would produce a great effect.
Lord Raglan replied that he entirely agreed with me, but, he added, it
was useless to argue the question, as he had just received a message
from General Pélissier altering previous arrangements, and saying that
the French columns would attack at daylight.[38] The necessary orders
were, of course, given.
FOOTNOTES:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account