Reformed Logic: A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of DialecticMcLachlan, D. B.
Philosophy
Reformed Logic: A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of Dialectic
McLachlan, D. B.
Logic
[Footnote 16: Though evidently suggested by language, the
form which the syllogistic logic finally assumed is so unlike
anything grammatical, that it is easily convertible into
symbols having no resemblance to language. It has been
put into literal symbols with algebraic values, and into
geometrical diagrams. A logical machine has even been invented
by Professor Jevons, 'worked by keys like a pianoforte,' which
returns 'infallible answers'--of the Aristotelian sort--to
every kind of question. That is sufficiently unlike both
reason and language.]
FALLACIES
XXIX--OF EQUIVOCATION AND MAL-OBSERVATION
Fallacies are counterfeit or sham arguments. They may fail to be
arguments--(1) because their antecedents are false; (2) because the
antecedents though true are not arranged dialectically, and do not
suggest the right conclusion; (3) because the language is equivocal.
To take the last first. So many things are called by the same name,
and so many different names may be applied to the same thing, that if
we attempt to argue from words alone, without any personal knowledge
of the things or judgments that are in question, we shall certainly
make mistakes. The only security against this sort of fallacy is much
experience, and the self-denial necessary to relinquish argument and
the criticism of arguments, when we have no sufficient knowledge of
the data.
The degree of imperfection in observation which should be considered
to render the theorem fallacious, is no easy matter to determine. One
class of logicians (the Formal) get over the difficulty by declaring
that dialectic is not concerned with concrete knowledge at all,[17]
but only with its general properties (as conceived by Aristotle),
and they have set up as a standard of logical truth the capability of
being imagined. A centaur is to them as true a fact as a horse, and
they would accept as valid such a theorem as this: 'All centaurs
object to be shod with iron; Gryneus is a centaur; therefore we may
conclude that he would resist being shod with iron.' No amount of
conceivability or formal coherence can make this other than nonsense.
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