In the remaining categories the reduction to 'is' has, if possible, a worse effect. In changing 'Canada lies west of Ireland' into 'Canada is a country lying west of Ireland,' we lose the relation in concretion, and express instead a verbal definition. Instead of affirming a position we explain a name. In such a proposition as 'the town of A lies 100 miles due north of B,' it is plain the predicate cannot be a class, for only one place has the quality expressed. In the fifth category we have such a proposition as 'water freezes when the temperature falls to zero Centigrade.' This is turned into a substantive sentence by saying 'water is that liquid which freezes,' &c., which is a verbal or identical proposition. 'Cecrops founded Athens' is a judgment in causation. In turning it into 'Cecrops was (or is) the founder of Athens,' we emphasise the man's name, but the relation signified by 'founded' is slurred over or lost sight of. Boole converts 'Caesar conquered the Gauls' into 'Caesar is he who conquered the Gauls,'[23] and this he interpreted as classification. We need not be surprised that he should suppose a class could be formed by one individual, for he elsewhere tells us that _Nothing_ is a class.[24] Classification is not judgment of any sort--it is a variety of recollection. Logicians imagine it is the only judgment, and so far as they can they degrade true judgments to that spurious form. _Moods of the Syllogism._ Having persuaded themselves that classification is the beginning, middle, and end of reasoning, logicians next proceed to divide the matter of their science. Modern logicians who have some acquaintance with real thinking as exemplified in works of physical science, can, if acting according to their natural intelligence, lay down correct rules for dividing a subject. These are simple and obvious: divide according to fundamental resemblance--let each division correspond to some definite human utility--let the more important properties take precedence of the less important, and so forth: the merest common sense. But in the division of their own subject they follow Aristotle, and so lose their way. It is plain that an act of reasoning is a mental thing in the first place, and only when uttered, and thus in a secondary sense, is it a material object. The classification of arguments should therefore follow mental characteristics. Logicians make it follow the material characteristics of the terms in which the arguments are uttered. Their moods of the syllogism are mere varieties of expression, not varieties of reason.