the Russo-Turkish War of 1877: here, indeed, the very existence of Roumania was at stake. The situation may be read between the lines in the present volume. The King, by virtue of a convention, had allowed the Russians to march through Roumania, but the latter had declined an acceptable alliance which the Roumanians wished for. When things in Bulgaria went badly with the Russians, they wanted to call upon some bodies of Roumanian troops which were stationed on the banks of the Danube. The King, or, as he was then, Prince Charles, with the instinct of the soldier--and in this case, moreover, of the far-sighted politician--was burning to let Roumania take her share in the struggle. But he was determined that she should only enter the fray--if at all--as an independent belligerent power. So he held back--and held back again, risking the grave danger which might accrue to Roumania, and above all to himself, from ultimate Russian resentment. In the meantime, the Russians were defeated in the battles round Plevna; still he held back; not with a point-blank refusal, but with a dilatory evasiveness which drove the Russians nearly frantic. For, during those terrible months of July and August 1877, in which their soldiers were dying like flies, they could see the whole Roumanian army standing ready mobilised, but motionless, a few hours away to the north, on the Danube--immovable in the face of all Muscovite appeals for assistance. At last the Russians were obliged to accept Prince Charles's conditions, to agree to allow him the independent command of all Roumanian troops, and to place a large corps of Russian troops besides under his orders. Then, indeed, the former Prussian lieutenant started within twenty-four hours, after playing the Russians at their own game for four months, and beating them at it to boot. Had Russia refused his demands, not a single Roumanian would have entered upon that struggle in the subsequent course of which their Sovereign covered himself with renown. It was no part of his business as the ruler of Roumania to seek military glory _per se_, although the instinct for such was strong within the Hohenzoller. Also on the 11th September, the battle of Grivitza--which was fought against his advice--saw him at his post, and sixteen thousand Russians and Roumanians[4] were killed and wounded under his command, probably a greater number slain in open battle in one day than England has lost in all her wars since the Crimea! Surely there was something of the heroic here; and yet it could hardly weigh as an achievement when compared with those Fabian tactics which preceded it, and the execution of which, until the psychological moment came, called for nerves of steel. Hardly ever has _la politique dilatoire_--of which Prince Bismarck was such a master in his dealings with Benedetti--had an apter exponent than King Charles on this eventful occasion. And its results, although afterwards curtailed by the decision of the Berlin