Gentlemen, this is _not_ a libel on Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond, in his private or individual capacity. It does not interfere with the privacy of his domestic life. It is free from any reproach upon his domestic habits or conduct; it is perfectly pure from any attempt to traduce his personal honor or integrity. Towards the man, there is not the least taint of malignity; nay, the thing is still stronger. Of Charles, Duke of Richmond, personally, and as disconnected with the administration of public affairs, it speaks in terms of civility and even respect.[4] It contains this passage which I read from the indictment: “Had he remained what he first came over, or what he afterwards professed to be, he would have retained his reputation for _honest open hostility_, defending his political principles with firmness, perhaps with warmth, but without rancor; the supporter and not the tool of an administration; a mistaken politician, perhaps, but an honorable man and a respectable soldier.” The Duke is here in this libel, my lords,--in this libel, gentlemen of the jury, the Duke of Richmond is called an honorable man and a respectable soldier! Could more flattering expressions be invented? Has the most mercenary Press that ever yet existed, the mercenary Press of this metropolis, contained, in return for all the money it has received, any praise which ought to be so pleasing--“an honorable man and a respectable soldier”? I do, therefore, beg of you, gentlemen, as you value your honesty, to carry with you in your distinct recollection this fact, that whatever of evil this publication may contain, it does not involve any reproach against the Duke of Richmond in any other than in his public and official character. I have, gentlemen, next to require you to take notice that this publication is not indicted as a seditious libel. The word seditious is, indeed, used as a kind of make-weight in the introductory part of the indictment. But mark, and recollect, that this is not an indictment for sedition. It is not, then, for private slander, nor for any offence against the constitution, that Mr. Magee now stands arraigned before you. In the third place, gentlemen, there is this singular feature in this case, namely, that this libel, as the prosecutor calls it, is not charged in this indictment to be “false.” The indictment has this singular difference from any other I have ever seen, that the assertions of the publications are not even stated to be false.