Representative British Orations Volume 4 (of 4): With Introductions and Explanatory Notes — John Shaqi
Representative British Orations Volume 4 (of 4): With Introductions and Explanatory Notes
History
Representative British Orations Volume 4 (of 4): With Introductions and Explanatory Notes
Speeches, addresses, etc., English
They have not had the courtesy to you, to state upon record that these
charges, such as they are, were contrary to the truth. This I believe
to be the first instance in which the allegation of falsehood has
been omitted. To what is this omission to be attributed? Is it that
an experiment is to be made, how much further the doctrine of the
criminality of truth can be drawn? Does the prosecutor wish to make
another bad precedent; or is it in contempt of any distinction between
truth and falsehood, that this charge is thus framed; or does he fear
that you would scruple to convict, if the indictment charged that to be
false which you all know to be true?
However that may be, I will have you to remember that you are now to
pronounce upon a publication, _the truth of which is not controverted_.
Attend to the case, and you will find you are not to try Mr. Magee
for sedition which may endanger the state, or for private defamation
which may press sorely upon the heart, and blast the prospects of a
private family; and that the subject matter for your decision is not
characterized as false, or described as untrue.
Such are the circumstances which accompany this publication, on which
you are to pronounce a verdict of guilt or innocence. The case is with
you; it belongs to you exclusively to decide it. His lordship may
advise, but he cannot control your decision, and it belongs to you
alone to say whether or not, upon the entire matter, you conceive it
to be evidence of guilt, and deserving of punishment. The statute law
gives or recognizes this your right, and, therefore, imposes this on
you as your duty. The legislative has precluded any lawyer from being
able to dictate to you. The Solicitor-General cannot now venture to
promulgate the slavish doctrine which he addressed to Doctor Sheridan’s
jury, when he told them, “not to _presume_ to differ from the Court in
matter of law.” The law and the fact are here the same, namely, the
guilty or innocent design of the publication.
Indeed, in any criminal case, the doctrine of the Solicitor-General is
intolerable. I enter my solemn protest against it. The verdict which is
required from a jury in any criminal case has nothing special in it--it
is not the finding of the fact in the affirmative or negative--it is
not, as in Scotland, that the charge is proved or not proved. No; the
jury is to say whether the prisoner be guilty or not; and could a
juror find a true verdict, who declared a man guilty upon evidence of
some act, perhaps praiseworthy, but clearly void of evil design or bad
consequences?
I do, therefore, deny the doctrine of the learned gentleman; it is not
constitutional, and it would be frightful if it were. _No judge can
dictate to a jury_--no jury ought to allow itself to be dictated to.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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