This has been a sad and destructive business. We were ordered to send off all our heavy baggage, but so badly did they manage that none of it was sent back, and every particle of that baggage, blankets, and every imaginable useful article, was burned up to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. My brigade must have lost half a million of property and all the rest were in the same condition. Millions of stores with guns and ammunition were destroyed. Never was any business worse managed. The enemy had no more idea of attacking us in Centreville than they had of attacking the Peaks of Otter. Of course, when we retreated, they sent marauding parties in our trail to watch our retreat and take possession of the country, and now the whole of the beautiful Counties of Loudon, Fauquier, Prince William, Fairfax, and the Lord only knows how many more, are in the possession of the enemy. It was a sad, distressing sight, all the way along, and one that frequently drew tears from my eyes. I do not know what it means, but I would rather have fought ten battles than thus to have abandoned these poor people. We have got to fight somewhere, and if I had my way, I would fight them on the first inch of our soil they invaded, and never cease to fight them as long as I could rally men to defend their homes. The great body of the army is now in the neighborhood, and I suppose we shall abandon these people and retreat back toward Richmond.... My command is in excellent condition. A few broke down on the way, but I managed to have them taken care of there and lost none of them on the march. One of the great features of General Toombs' control of his brigade was the excellent care he took of his men. He never allowed them to be imposed upon by the officers or by other commands. This letter betrays the impatience of General Toombs over any mismanagement. He was the soul of business, and as the transportation facilities at Manassas were meager, he chafed under the heavy loss to which his brigade was subjected in this retreat. With impetuous ardor he calls for resistance, not retreat. He did not approve of the "Fabian policy" of Joseph E. Johnston. As General Longstreet afterward remarked, "Toombs chafed at the delays of the commanders in their preparations for battle. His general idea was that the troops went out to fight, and he thought that they should be allowed to go at it at once." Near Orange Court House, he wrote to his wife on the 19th of March, 1862, "I know not what is to become of this country. Davis' incompetency is more apparent as our danger increases. Our only hope is Providence."