The right of _taking_ auspices was neither a priestly nor even a magisterial function, but was possessed by every Patrician. But the man in a private capacity could exercise it only in his private concerns; the auspices destined to guide public action are vested in the person of the patrician magistrate. Hence the distinction between _auspicia publica_ and _privata_. There was a time when no important act of business or domestic life was undertaken without an appeal for divine guidance.[135] Marriage especially demanded the taking of the auspices; and even when the custom of such private divination had become wholly discarded, a survival of the custom is found in the presence of _auspices_, friends of the bridegroom who superintend the due performance of the rites.[136] The _confarreatio_ was older than the traditional institution of the augural college, and it is not probable that official intervention was brought to bear on marriage, still less on such concerns as were more strictly private. Hence it is difficult to see how the Plebeians could have been prevented from taking the _auspicia privata_, although their use of them was probably scoffed at by their patrician rulers. On the one hand, we find that the incapacity of the Plebeians to share in the auspices was one of the arguments used against the permission of _conubium_ between the orders;[137] on the other, that the _auspex_ continues to be an integral part of a ceremony which was founded on plebeian marriage law. It was different with the auspices taken on behalf of the state (_auspicia publica_). It is the Patricians alone who have these auspices, and only a magistrate belonging to the order can exercise the right of looking for them (_spectio_).[138] This remains not only a purely magisterial, but a purely patrician privilege, and the so-called plebeian magistrates of later times, great as their power was, had not the gift. It is quite true that, after the Plebs had forced its way into the consulship, this right could not be denied to the plebeian holders of the supreme office. But the admission was based on the legal fiction that the holder of an office once reserved to the _patres_ was, for religious purposes, a patrician magistrate.[139]