Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Philosophy
Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?
Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Diplomacy; Europe -- Politics and government
When the international crisis came to a head suddenly in July, 1911,
through the disconcerting action of the German Government in sending a
war vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken by surprise and was
absolutely in the dark as to the issues and interests involved as well
as to the commitments which had been made by the British and French
foreign offices. The text of the secret treaty between France and Spain
had, however, now been secured by the Paris papers _Le Temps_ and
_Le Matin_. This revelation led to party attacks on secret diplomacy
in the British House of Commons and in the French Parliament. Baron
d’Estournelles de Constant, in February, 1912, said:
... “Why was the French Parliament told only half the truth
when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with
England? Why was it allowed to suspect that this arrangement had
as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other
secret treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards
Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse
of trust.... Now the whole effort of the arrangement of 1904
appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a treaty of
friendship with England recognizing the freedom of our political
action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the
integrity of that country; that was what the public knew and
approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by
other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the
partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of
that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity.”
In the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon charged that “the Foreign
Office policy has become during the last ten years progressively more
secret every year. For ten years the foreign policy of this country has
been conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy.”
VI
ENTENTE DIPLOMACY
As the commitments of the British Government gradually became more and
more known the question arose as to how deeply and extensively Great
Britain had been involved in continental affairs. Lord Rosebery, who
was uninformed, with the rest of Parliament and the public, as to the
actual details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January, 1912:
“This we do know about our foreign policy, that, for good or for
evil, we are now embraced in the midst of the Continental system.
That I regard as perhaps the gravest fact in the later portion of
my life. We are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental
system, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, because
I do not know enough about it, but which, at any rate, may at
any time bring us into conflict with armies numbering millions,
and our own forces would hardly be counted in such a war as they
stand at present.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account